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Abstract
We introduce a two-stage ranking of multidimensional alternatives, in-
cluding uncertain prospects as particular case, when these objects can be
given a suitable matrix form. The first stage defines a ranking of rows and
a ranking of columns, and the second stage ranks matrices by applying
natural monotonicity conditions to these auxiliary rankings. Owing to the
Debreu-Gorman theory of additive separability, this framework is suffi-
cient to generate very precise numerical representations. We apply them
to three main types of multidimensional objects: streams of commodity
baskets through time, monetary input-output matrices, and most exten-
sively, uncertain prospects either in a social or an individual context of de-
cision. Among other applications, the new approach delivers the strongest
existing form of Harsanyi’s (1955) Aggregation Theorem and casts light
on the classic comparison between the ex ante and ex post Pareto prin-
ciple. It also provides a novel derivation of subjective probability from
preferences, in the style of Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
1 Introduction and overview
Consider the classic intertemporal choice problem in consumer theory, i.e., to
choose among intertemporal consumption plans ranging over several goods. A
convenient way to tackle this problem would be to construct a preference rank-
ing of consumption plans from two sets of preference rankings that are easier
to define. First, rank streams of consumption through time for each good in
isolation, and also rank complete good baskets for each time in isolation. Then,
rank consumption plans by aggregating the information contained in these two
auxiliary rankings.
Now suppose that a social observer makes a decision about social prospects,
which consist in distributing money across both individuals and states of the
world. This can be dealt with as before, by starting with two kinds of simpler
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preference rankings. Here, one kind of preference is obtained by fixing the indi-
viduals and letting the states vary, and the other by fixing the state and letting
the individual vary. Put differently, the observer will judge the social prospects
both from an ex ante individual perspective and from an ex post social per-
spective, and his final preferences will result from aggregating these two sets of
judgments.
In the previous examples, a decision had to be made between practical alter-
natives, and this involved defining preferences, but in related settings, multidi-
mensional quantities are compared more abstractly. Suppose that a statistician
aims at comparing national economies in terms of the extent to which they in-
tegrate their different sectors, and for this purpose, she relies on their monetary
input-output tables. We assume that the tables involve the same list of sectors
for all economies, and the transactions of a larger economy are commensurable
with those of a smaller one (for instance, the raw figures have been changed by a
size factor). Taking the problem as before, the statistician would define two sets
of integration rankings, one in which sectors stand as sellers and the other in
which they stand as purchasers. Her final integration ranking would synthetize
these partial comparisons. Thus, the previous method works for information
processing as well as preference construction.
In this article, we develop an aggregative theory which accounts for all three
of these examples. Initially, the theory was meant only for the second exam-
ple, having been motivated by earlier work by the first author on social choice
under uncertainty,1 but it proved easy and rewarding to state it in fuller gener-
ality, so as to cover the (classic) first example, the (non-conventional) third one,
and quite a few others that come to the mind once the formalism is place. A
fourth major example, which relates to individual decision making and subjec-
tive probability, will be introduced in due course. However, social choice under
uncertainty still looms large in what follows, being an area to which the theory
applies especially well.
Before proceeding, we will briefly sketch the main technical ideas of the
paper. In general, the alternatives to be compared are multidimensional, and
take the form of matrices of real numbers, with the indexes of rows and columns
representing two qualitatively different types of attributes. To take more than
two types of attributes into consideration, it is enough to increase the number
of rows, columns, or both; thus, states of nature may be introduced in the
first example, and multiple commodities or time periods in the second one.
More subtly, it could happen that the attributes exhibit some kind of logical
interdependency. In this case, the matricial form of the alternatives would be
inappropriate.2
We assume that alternatives are ranked as follows. Each row index gener-
ates a ranking of those rows which are feasible given that index. Likewise, each
column index generates a ranking of the feasible columns for that index. The
overall ranking of feasible matrices takes these auxiliary rankings into account
1See the unpublished paper by Blackorby et al. (2004). A comparison follows Theorem 3.
2However, it is possible that a finer description of the attributes make them suitably
independent. For a discussion, see Keeney (1981).
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by monotonically increasing with them, i.e., if two matrices differ only in one
row, and one matrix has this row ranked above the corresponding row of the
other, then the first matrix is higher than the second in the overall ranking.
The same holds for columns instead of rows. By a further monotonicity condi-
tion, two matrices that differ in only one coordinate (ie. row-column pair), are
ranked as the numbers in that coordinate; this fixes the direction of the overall
ranking in another way. The three axioms — called Row Preferences, Col-
umn Preferences and Coordinate Monotonicity —often become famil-
iar once the application context is fixed. In the intertemporal choice problem,
with the matrix components representing dated quantities of goods, the axioms
are standard dominance or monotonicity conditions. In the uncertain social
choice problem, with the matrix components representing state-dependent util-
ity values, they translate into dominance conditions at the individual level and
unanimity-preservation (Pareto) conditions at the social level. We also impose
Continuity on the overall ranking.
Under plausible technical assumptions, the four conditions together deliver
a representation theorem of a classic format: the overall ranking of matrices
can be represented by a fully additively separable value function, i.e., a sum of
value functions defined for each coordinate (Proposition 2). This representation
was axiomatized by Debreu (1960) and Gorman (1968b), given earlier work by
Leontief (1947) and Nataf (1948), and it has since then pervaded microeco-
nomic theory (see Blackorby, Primont, and Russell, 1978) and multiattribute
decision theory (see Fishburn, 1970, Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, Wakker, 1989).
However, it is not derived here in exactly the standard way. The existing theo-
rems assume that the ranking of vector-valued alternatives is totally separable
—roughly speaking, defined componentwise —but we must deduce this property
from our primitives. Also, we take account of feasibility constraints, by relaxing
the assumption (made by Debreu, Gorman, and many others) that the set of
alternatives is a full Cartesian product.
As it reexpresses the two-stage analysis of the three examples, Proposition
2 shows that, for all its naturalness, this analysis is constraining and sometimes
undesirable. Depending on the applications, it can be seen to deliver either as a
positive characterization or as an impossibility theorem. The same ambivalence
underlies our two main results, Theorems 3 and 5, to be described now.
These results need more axioms, and in particular, require the overall ranking
to be invariant between rows (Row Invariance), or between columns (Col-
umn Invariance), or both at the same time. With these additional assump-
tions, Theorem 3 strengthens the additively separable representation of Propo-
sition 2 into a weighted sum of value functions, where the value functions may
differ only across columns, or only among columns, or not at all, depending
on the invariance conditions just described. We apply Theorem 3 to uncertain
social choice, taking the numbers in the matrices to be utility values rather than
physical quantities; then our formalism reexpresses a problem of normative eco-
nomics that we can attack afresh. As is well-known, when social alternatives are
uncertain, the Pareto principle can have two forms, either ex ante or ex post,
and the question arises whether they can be made compatible. This has been de-
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bated in welfare economics Hammond (1981), moral philosophy Broome (1991),
and axiomatic decision theory Mongin (1995). The widespread answer is that
the two forms of the Pareto principle are compatible only if the individuals’ and
the social observer’s ex ante preferences obey stringent restrictions. However,
this conclusion depends on the prior assumption that the individuals and the
social observer satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory, and little is known
on the compatibility problem when this major assumption is relaxed. Because
the decision-theoretic properties encapsulated in our axioms are so weak, Theo-
rem 3 shows what happens in this case. The conclusion remains gloomy: despite
the weaker premises, the same stringent conditions are necessary to achieve ex
ante and ex post compatibility.
A related connection is with Harsanyi’s (1955) Aggregation Theorem, which
states that a Paretian and von Neumann-Morgenstern aggregate of individual
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions is a weighted sum of these util-
ity functions. Viewed in this light, Theorem 3 is a generalization that replaces
Harsanyi’s von Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions by mere dominance condi-
tions. In the end, we do not dispense with von Neumann-Morgenstern theory,
because we deduce it at the same time as we obtain the weighted sum rule, so
this is another ambivalent finding. On the one hand, we reinforce Harsanyi’s
intriguing argument for utilitarianism; on the other, we establish once and for
all that his argument cannot live outside of the narrow framework of some form
of expected utility decision theory.
The other main result, Theorem 5, is in the same vein, but relies on a differ-
ent trade-off in assumptions. It weakens the domain assumptions of Proposition
2 and Theorem 3, and in exchange, it reinforces the ranking conditions by com-
bining dominance with betweenness. This condition emerged in the early dis-
cussions of non-expected utility theory as an attractive stopping place, because,
like von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, it entails linear indifference curves, and
unlike it, permits these curves not to be parallel (see Chew, 1983, and Dekel,
1986). In the conclusions of Theorem 5, the ranking of matrices is represented
by a twice weighted sum of numbers, with one set of weights holding for rows and
the other for columns. At this stage, value functions have vanished and straight
linearity has replaced the additively separable representations. Theorem 5 com-
pletes the discussion of ex ante and ex post forms of the Pareto principle by
reconciling them at an even higher price than before, and when compared with
Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem, it provides another generalization, in which
the von Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions are now replaced with dominance
plus betweenness.
Theorem 5 can also cast light on classical axiomatic decision theory, through
yet another interpretation of the rows and columns of alternatives; this the
fourth major example of the paper. Matrices now become mixed prospects in
the sense of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) —i.e., prospects that associate states
of nature with von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries. Theorem 5 then amounts
to a new derivation of the subjective probability that underlies the individual’s
preferences among prospects. The novelty lies with the weak assumptions. We
require the induced preference over lotteries to satisfy only dominance and be-
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tweenness, not the whole of von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, as Anscombe
and Aumann do. Furthermore, our derivation of subjective probability takes
feasibility constraints into account by working for smaller sets of prospects than
the Cartesian product they only consider. This application pushes the analysis
into another direction than the three basic examples, thus confirming its wide
expressive power.
The final result of the paper is a variant of Proposition 2 that is specially
devised to tackle the problem of economic integration. As the statistician of
this example is likely to renormalize the monetary input-output data , we face
a mathematical constraint that is not present in the other applications. While
these applications call for a set of alternatives of full algebraic dimension, this is
not the case here. However, the problem can be circumvented, and we eventually
analyze the economic integration case along the same line as the others.
2 The framework and a preliminary result with
application to intertemporal choice
We fix two sets of indexes, N := {1, . . . , i, ..., n} and M := {1, . . . , j, ...,m},
with n,m ≥ 2, in order to represent the relevant attributes of the objects to be
ranked. These are identified with bundles of quantities xij for all (i, j) ∈ N×M),
which we analyze as follows. First, taking Rij ⊆ R to be open intervals for all
i ∈ N and j ∈ M ,3 we define an alternative X to be an element of their
Cartesian product:
X ∈ RNM :=
∏
i∈N
∏
j∈M
Rij .
We will usually write X in matrix form, i.e., X = [xij ]
i∈N
j∈M , but sometimes also
as a vector of rows or as a vector columns, i.e.,
X = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and X = (x1,x2, . . . , xm),
where, for each j ∈ M , xj := [xij ]i∈N , an element of
∏
i∈N Rij , and for each
i ∈ N , xi := [xij ]j∈M , an element of
∏
j∈M Rij .
Second, we assume that feasibility constraints restrict the set RNM . For tech-
nological reasons, it may be impossible to realize all and every distribution of
goods through time periods or amongst individuals; for economic reasons, some
distributions of money among individuals may be excluded in some states of the
world, and so on. To cover many cases at once, we propose to take the set of
feasible alternatives to be an open, connected subset X ⊆ RNM . This is in line
with some advanced utility-theoretic literature Segal (1992); Chateauneuf and
Wakker (1993). The next sections will introduce more restrictions on the set of
alternatives X . We assume that only the feasible alternatives can be compared
3We restrict the exposition to this case for mathematical simplicity. Our results carry
through to the case where each Rij is a weakly ordered, path-connected topological space.
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or need comparing, and thus introduce an order  on X rather than RNM .
Define X i := {xi; X ∈ X}, for all i ∈ N . Define Xj := {xj ; X ∈ X}, for all
j ∈M . The following axioms will be maintained throughout on .
Continuity: The order  is continuous, i.e., its upper and lower contour sets
are closed subsets of X .
Row Preferences: For all i ∈ N , there is an order i on X i such that, for all
X, Y ∈ X , and all i ∈ N , if xh ≈h yh for all h ∈ N \ {i}, then X  Y
if and only if xi i yi.
Column Preferences: For all j ∈ M , there is an order j on Xj such that,
for all X, Y ∈ X , and all j ∈ M , if xk ≈k yk for all k ∈ M \ {j}, then
X  Y if and only if xj j yj .
Coordinate Monotonicity: For all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , and all X,Y ∈ X
with xhk = y
h
k for all (h, k) ∈ N ×M \ {(i, j)}, we have X  Y if and only
if xij ≥ yij .
The last axiom is best understood in terms of two sufficient conditions stated
in the following lemma. Here and below, vector inequalities have the usual
componentwise definition.4
Lemma 1 Let X ⊆ RN×M be an open set, and let  be an order on X that
has Column Preferences and Row Preferences. If  satisfies either of
the following conditions, then  satisfies Coordinate Monotonicity.
Row Monotonicity: For all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , and any x,y ∈ X i with
xk = yk for all k ∈M \ {j}, we have x i y if and only if xj ≥ yj.
Column Monotonicity: For all j ∈ M and i ∈ N , and any x,y ∈ Xj, with
xh = yh for all h ∈ N \ {i}, we have x j y if and only if xi ≥ yi.
Conversely, if X is convex, then Coordinate Monotonicity is equivalent to
each of Row Monotonicity and Column Monotonicity.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and all other results are in the Appendix.
In the intertemporal choice problem, we will conventionally decide that N
and M represent time periods and goods, respectively. Thus, with the num-
bers xij measuring physical quantities, Row Preferences says that, for each
given time,  is increasing with respect to the instantaneous preferences over
baskets of goods, and Column Preferences says that, for each given good,
the overall preference  is increasing with respect to the preferences over con-
sumption streams. These are dominance properties in the sense considered by
multiattribute preference theory (see, e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, ch. 3).
4If v = (v1, ..., vq) and v′ = (v′1, ..., v
′
q), we write v ≥ v′ if vp ≥ v′p, for all p ∈ {1, ..., q},
and v > v′ if the same holds with v 6= v′. We say that v is non-negative (strictly positive)
if v ≥ 0 (resp. v > 0).
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Coordinate Monotonicity, Row Monotonicity and Column Mono-
tonicity are familiar monotonicity conditions from consumer theory, saying in
effect that all the goods, at all times, are valuable.
In the uncertain social choice problem, we will conventionally decide that
N and M represent individuals and states of nature, respectively. We can take
the xij to be physical quantities, as in the previous case, or to be utility values,
which conceptually amounts to endorsing a welfaristic position in normative
economics.5 We consider the latter interpretation, both because it illustrates
another use of the formalism, and because it connects with the theoretical is-
sues highlighted in the introduction. Thus, what the social preference  ranks
are ex ante social allocations viewed in utility terms, and Row Preferences
has two implications: (a) if all individuals are indifferent between two social
prospects, then so is the social preference; (b) if an individual ranks a social
prospect above another, and all others are indifferent, then the social preference
ranks the former above the latter. Statement (a) is the ex ante Pareto Indiffer-
ence condition. Statement (b) is not quite the ex ante Strict Pareto condition,
since it must be applied iteratively to deliver this condition, and the domain
must be rich enough for the iteration to take place. Given our basic domain
assumption, we can only conclude that ex ante Strict Pareto holds locally, i.e.,
for any X ∈ X , there is an open neighbourhood YX ⊆ X with X ∈ YX such
that, for any Y ∈ YX with xi i yi for all individuals i ∈ N , and xi i yi for
some i ∈ N , we have X  Y.6 Thus, the ex ante Pareto Principle holds in a
somewhat weakened way.
Now, Column Preferences means that the ex ante social preference 
is increasing with respect to each social preference obtained by conditioning
on some state. Since the xij are utility numbers, Row Monotonicity makes
the same claim for the i vis-a`-vis their own conditionals. This is a classic
dominance property, which is satisfied not only by expected utility, but also
by rank-dependent utility and most received non-expected utility construals.
Column Monotonicity means that in every realized state, the ex post social
preference satisfies both Pareto Indifference (trivially) and an individual-by-
individual version of Strict Pareto (nontrivially). This is the ex post Pareto
Principle, though in the same weaker form as the ex ante principle. As before,
this interpretation relies on taking the xij to be utility numbers.
In the assessment of economic integration, Coordinate Monotonicity
is natural, but Row and Column Preferences are somewhat questionable.
However, if the statistician manages to establish the integration rankings asso-
ciated with i and j , then it is natural to assume that her overall integration
ranking  varies monotonically with them.
We now move to more technical assumptions, which are essential to the
proofs. For all Y ∈ X , and all i ∈ N and j ∈M , the (i, j)-section of X through
Y is the set {X ∈ X ; xij = yij}, an (N ·M − 1)-dimensional subset of RNM . We
5In normative economics, welfarism is the claim that individual utility values capture all
the information on alternatives that may be relevant to the social evaluation.
6If X is convex, one can take YX = X for all X ∈ X .
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say X is sectionally connected if each (i, j)-section is connected. This condition
is neither stronger nor weaker than ordinary connectedness; see the examples
by Segal (1992), Wakker (1993), and Chateauneuf and Wakker (1993) , which
also illustrate why this is an important restriction. In words, to say that X is
(path-)connected means that, given any two feasible alternatives X and Y, it
is possible continuously to transform X into Y by moving along a continuous
path of feasible alternatives.7 Sectional connectedness resembles connectedness,
except that it requires one to transform X into Y while holding constant the
value of one coordinate. The set X ⊆ RNM is both connected and sectionally
connected if it is convex or (an even more restrictive condition) if it is a box
—i.e. X = ∏i∈N ∏j∈M Bij , where Bij ⊆ Rij is an interval for all i ∈ N and
j ∈M .
Finally, we say that X is -indifference connected if, for all Y ∈ X , the
indifference set { X ∈ X ; Y ≈ X} is a connected subset of X . The above papers
also illustrate why this restriction matters to additive separability. Here are two
cases in which it holds.
(a) If X is an open box in RN×M , then X is -indifference connected. (See
Appendix for proof.)
(b) Suppose X is a convex and comprehensive subset of RN×M+ . If  is qua-
siconcave, then X is -indifference connected.8
For all i ∈ N and j ∈M , let X ij := {xij ; X ∈ X} ⊆ Rij . Now to our first result.
Proposition 2 Let X ⊆ RNM be open. Let  be an order on X that has Row
Preferences and Column Preferences, and which satisfies Continuity
and Coordinate Monotonicity. Then:
(a) For all X ∈ X , there is an open neighbourhood Y ⊆ X with X ∈ Y,
and for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , there are continuous increasing functions
uij : X ij−→ R such that  is represented on Y by the additive function
U : Y−→R defined by
U(Y) :=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
uij(y
i
j), for all Y ∈ Y.
Furthermore, in this representation, the uij are unique up to positive affine
transformations with a common multiplier.9
7Any open subset of a Euclidean space is connected if and only if it is path-connected, so
that we may identify the two notions here.
8The set X ⊆ RN×M is comprehensive if for all X ∈ X , and all X′ ∈ RN×M , if X′ ≤ X
then X′ ∈ X . The order  is quasi-concave if all of its upper contour sets are convex.
9That is, if the functions u˜ij : X ij −→R are such that  is represented on Y by the function
U˜ defined by
U˜(Y) :=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
u˜ij(y
i
j), for all Y ∈ Y,
then there exist a > 0 and bij ∈ R such that, for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , u˜ij(yij) = a uij(yij) + bij
for all Y ∈ Y.
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(b) Suppose X is also connected, sectionally connected, and -indifference con-
nected. Then we can take Y = X in part (a).
(c) In this case, for all i ∈ N , the order i is represented by the function
U i : X i−→ R defined by
U i(x) :=
∑
j∈M
uij(xj), for all x ∈ X i.
(d) Likewise, for all j ∈ M , the order j is represented by the function Uj :
Xj−→ R defined by
Uj(x) :=
∑
i∈N
uij(x
i), for all x ∈ Xj.
Proposition 2 is closely related to Debreu (1960)’s theorem on additively
separable representations, but unlike this classic result, it does not explicitly
assume that the preference order is totally separable. Indeed, the proof first es-
tablishes total separability via the theory developed in Gorman (1968b). Then,
using Debreu (1960), it concludes that there exists a local additively separable
representation around any given alternative and it finishes by gluing these local
representations together.
In general, the functions uij are all different, and to obtain a relationship be-
tween them will be the object of the following sections and their more advanced
results. Our applications to uncertain social choice and economic integration
require these later results, but Proposition 2 offers a relevant perspective on
the application to intertemporal choice, as we now discuss. In this case, uij is a
utility function for consumption of good j at time i, U i is a utility function over
consumption bundles at time i, Uj is a utility function over streams of good j,
and U is a utility function for consumption plans.
Jevons and Walras discussed the “equation of exchange” —today’s textbook
equality between marginal utility ratios and marginal rates of substitution —in
terms of separable, and even additively separable, utility functions for consump-
tion goods, and they also stated their demand theory in this way. Edgeworth
pointed out that this was unnecessary for the purpose, still a mild point, but
later neo-classicals found more distressing objections. Implying as it does that
the marginal rate of substitution of a for b only depends on the quantities of
a and b, separability (more generally than additive separability) makes the law
of demand automatic under diminishing marginal utilities, thus wiping out the
possibility of a prevailing income effect. Moreover, separability hinders demand
theory by making it impossible to classify consumer goods into complements
and substitutes. These critical messages were taken aboard long ago, and it
comes to no surprise that postwar theorist Gorman10 expressed doubts about
the very assumptions that he was exploring mathematically.
10More obviously in Gorman (1968a) than in the other papers.
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Additively separable representations have on the whole been more success-
ful when they represent time preferences. Ramsey may have been the first to
employ such a functional form in his saving model, and it has persisted in the
neoclassical literature on intertemporal choices of consumption, investment or
money balances. This can be explained by analytical convenience, but no doubt
also by the fact that the objections to separability are not so strong here as
they are in the static case. Still, some are worrying, in particular that for some
goods, the quantity of today’s consumption influences the utility of tomorrow’s
consumption through habit formation.11
Given this controversial pedigree, Proposition 2 sounds like a mixed blessing.
On the one hand, it gives some warrant to old style neo-classical economics by
connecting it with a seemingly natural construction of preference; on the other,
the exceedingly strong functional forms testify against the construction. The
same conceptual ambivalence will appear in the next section, where we state
our first main result and apply it to the uncertain social choice problem.
3 A first theorem with application to uncertain
social choice
Although too strong in one sense, the conclusion of Proposition 2 is too weak in
another, because the additively separable representation does not impose any
relation between the utility functions defined coordinatewise. This section will
make the representation more informative by introducing both more axiomatic
conditions and more structural assumptions. In the former group, we will require
that there be a single preference order on rows, or a single preference order on
columns, or both. Define
XM :=
⋃
j∈M
Xj and XN :=
⋃
i∈N
X i.
Our two additional axioms read as follows.
Row Invariance: There is a single preference order N defined on XN , such
that for all i ∈ N , the order i is the restriction of N to X i.
Column Invariance: There is a single preference order M defined on XM ,
such that for all j ∈M , the order j is the restriction of M to Xj .
Since our framework treats rows and columns symmetrically, and their meaning
can be fixed at will, there is no point in considering both conditions unless they
apply at the same time. When only one of them applies, we will conventionally
select Column Invariance.
We will also sometimes require X to satisfy one or both of the following
structural conditions.
11This by now classic objection is discussed in detail by Browning (1991). The problems
raised by additive separability also appear in some management applications of the multiat-
tribute preference literature (see in particular Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
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Identical Row Spaces: X 1 = X 2 = · · · = Xn = XN .
Identical Column Spaces: X1 = X2 = · · · = Xm = XM .
Under the first condition, for any i ∈ N and j ∈ M , the projection of X i on
j ∈ M does not depend on i. Call this common projection X ∗j . We then have
XN ⊆ ∏j∈M X ∗j . Under the second condition, for any j ∈ M and i ∈ N , the
projection of Xj on i ∈ N does not depend on j. Call this common projection
X i∗. We then have XM ⊆
∏
i∈N X i∗. Here are two formal examples in which
these domain assumptions hold.
Examples. (a) If X is an open box in RNM , then X satisfies both Identical
Row Spaces and Identical Column Spaces.
(b) Suppose that, for all y ∈ XM , there exists X ∈ X such that xj = y for
all j ∈M . Then X satisfies Identical Column Spaces. ♦
Note that Row and Column Invariance are so formulated that no logical
implication holds between them and Identical Row Spaces or Identical Column
Spaces. However, the two sets of restrictions are related, and they are often
acceptable or rejectable together. In the intertemporal choice problem, with
the already fixed interpretation for N and M , Row Invariance and Identical
Row Spaces are implausible, while Column Invariance and Identical Column
Spaces are stringent without being absurd. The former says that one time ranks
commodity baskets like another when they are available at both times, and the
latter adds that exactly the same baskets are available at each time. This ex-
cludes habit formation and technical interdependencies that may arise between
periods, but existing time-separable representations of consumer theory often
dispense with these subtleties.
In the uncertain social choice problem, with xij representing utility, Row
Invariance becomes the implausible claim that the individuals have the same
preferences. But Identical Row Spaces is not so easy to discard. It says that the
set of utility vectors is common to all individuals, which makes sense if some in-
terpersonal utility comparisons have already taken place. Meanwhile, Column
Invariance says that ex post social preferences are state-independent, while
Identical Column Spaces says that the same social outcomes exist in each state.
These two state-independence assumptions are made by classical Bayesian theo-
rists such as Savage (1972) or Anscombe and Aumann (1963), when they derive a
subjective probability from preferences under uncertainty, and they have gener-
ally prevailed in the theoretical discussion of ex ante versus ex post Paretianism
that concern us.12 Furthermore, they are compatible with the individual agents
having state-dependent preferences (as explained below).
Now to our first main result. Given a set L = {1, 2, . . . , `} and a vector
p = (p1, ..., p`) ∈ RL, we say that p is a weight vector on L if pk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ L,
and
∑
k∈L pk = 1. The expression probability vector would be mathematically
12The papers by Mongin (1998), Chambers and Hayashi (2006), and Gajdos et al. (2008)
are exceptions.
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appropriate, but we reserve it for those cases in which elements of L represent
states of nature. The set of weight vectors on L is denoted by ∆L.
Theorem 3 Suppose X ⊆ RNM is open, connected, sectionally connected, -
indifference connected, and satisfies Identical Column Spaces. Then  has Row
Preferences and Column Preferences and satisfies Coordinate Mono-
tonicity, Continuity, and Column invariance if and only if:
(a) For all i ∈ N , there is an increasing, continuous function ui : X i∗−→R, such
that the order 
M
is represented by the function WM : XM−→R defined
by
WM (x) :=
∑
i∈N
ui(xi), for all x ∈ XM . (1)
(b) There is a strictly positive weight vector p ∈ ∆M , such that for all i ∈ N ,
the order i is represented by the function U ip : X i −→R yielding the
p-weighted value of ui. That is:
U ip(x) :=
∑
j∈M
pj u
i(xj), for all x ∈ X i. (2)
(c) The order  is represented by the function W : X−→R which computes the
p-weighted value of the function WM from part (a). That is:
W (X) :=
∑
j∈M
pjWM (xj) =
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
pj u
i(xij) =
∑
i∈N
U ip(x
i), for all X ∈ X .
(3)
(d) In this representation, the weight vector p is unique, and the functions
u1, . . . , un are unique up to positive affine transformations with a common
multiplier.
In terms of intertemporal choice, Theorem 3 says that time j does not influence
the shape of the utility functions ui defined for each commodity i, its role
being channelled through the weights pj , which should be viewed as discounting
factors.
In terms of uncertain social choice, the functions U ip and W of Theorem
3(b,c) are the individuals’ and the social observer’s ex ante utility functions. If
p is regarded as a probability vector, then these functions are shown to be of the
expected utility type. This is a striking result compared with the non-committal
decision theory we started with. To obtain it, we required only two things: first,
that both the individuals and social observer satisfy dominance (a property that
most non-expected utility models fulfil), and second, that the social observer has
Paretian and state-independent preferences. Note that Theorem 3(b) does not
impose state-independent preferences on the individual agents, because the xij
are taken to be preexisting utility values which may come from some state-
dependent utility functions, exogenous to our model.
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Theorem 3(a,c) gives another description of the social observer’s preferences,
this time in terms of social welfare functions. The ex post welfare functions WM
and the ex ante welfare function W are sums of the corresponding individual
utility functions, i.e. have the mathematical form of a weighted utilitarian rule.
This is another striking result, given that the axioms are stated in a purely
ordinal way.13
Finally, Theorem 3(d) confers uniqueness to the representations discussed
here, under the usual proviso that their mathematical pattern be respected.14
Without this addition, the functional forms in the earlier parts would have no
conceptual bearing at all, and it would not be sensible to view p as representing
a probability.
With these interpretations, Theorem 3 states that the ex ante and ex post
Pareto principles are compatible only if (1) the individuals and the social ob-
server are all expected utility maximizers, and (2) they compute their expected
utilities by using the same subjective probabilities. Hammond’s (1981) welfare
economics paper is the classic source for both the compatibility problem and
the answer that (2) is necessary for its solution. When investigating the aggre-
gation of Savage preferences, Mongin (1995) implicitly raised the compatibility
problem. His axiomatic treatment enlarges the set of possibilities somewhat. If
the individuals’ and the social observer’s utility functions are all alike up to
positive affine transformations, then the ex ante and ex post principles are
compatible, and more subtly, they can be so when weaker Pareto conditions
than the Pareto principle apply. These other possibilities lie outside the present
framework, so it is consistent that only condition (2) survives. The real news
concerns the necessary condition (1). The above papers (and others as well)
unexceptionally assume that both the individuals and the social observer sat-
isfy the axioms of subjective expected utility, whereas we now prove this in the
representation theorem. To appreciate the step forward, take probabilistically
sophisticated agents, i.e., agents who have well-defined subjective probabilities
despite obeying more general axioms than those of subjective expected utility.
They automatically satisfy our decision-theoretic conditions; thus, if they in-
sisted on respecting both the ex ante and ex post Pareto principle, they would
inexorably become subjective expected utility maximizers!
It is unclear whether (2) signals an impossibility or just a severe, but imple-
mentable restriction. Among the interpreters, Broome (1991) seems to take the
latter view, whereas Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998) favour the former. The
answer seems to us to depend on one’s underlying philosophy of probability,
and on the further issue of when exactly probabilities are computed: is it at
the completely ex ante stage, or rather at some interim stage? On one inter-
pretation, probabilities are subjective in the sense promoted by Savage, and
moreover, they are priors, i.e., embody no outside information at all; this would
make their interpersonal agreement very unlikely. On another interpretation,
13Whether the derived representation bears more than a formal analogy with classical util-
itarianism is a complex question that we do not discuss here.
14Non-affine monotonic transforms of the ui would represent the i equally well, but destroy
the expected utility form of the representations in Theorem 3(b,c).
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they are still subjective in the same sense, but count as posteriors, because they
embody some outside information; this would make their interpersonal agree-
ment less unlikely. Finally, they could be objective probabilities in one of the
senses that philosophers of probability have argued for.15 This interpretation
would make (2) unproblematic. However, it does not fit in with the present
frame of analysis, which is exclusively preference-based, like Savage’s. For the
weight function to represent an objective probability, at least some probabilistic
information would have to be included into the assumptions.
Numerous solutions have been proposed to escape from (2) when it is inter-
preted as an impossibility, some of which prioritize the ex post form of the Pareto
principle over the ex ante form,16 while others defend the opposite priority, and
still others reach compatibility by relaxing some decision-theoretic component
of the framework. We will not evaluate these theoretical possibilities here, but
Theorem 3 has a clear bearing on them, especially on the last group.17
By the same token, Theorem 3 is closely related in spirit to Harsanyi’s (1955)
Aggregation Theorem. According to this classic result, if the individuals have
von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences on a lottery set, and if the social observer
satisfies the Pareto principle and herself entertains von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences on the lottery set, then her preferences can be represented by a
positively weighted sum of the von Neumann-Morgenstern representations of
the individual preferences. Harsanyi interpreted this piece of formal reasoning as
constituting an argument for utilitarian ethics. Our framework does not contain
lotteries, so in order to bridge the gap with Harsanyi, we should replace his
theorem by one of the variants that were devised for state-contingent prospects
instead of lotteries.18 When this is done, Theorem 3 appears to be a stronger
form of the classic result: expected utility theory now belongs to the conclusions,
and the utilitarian-looking social welfare functions follow from much weaker
assumptions than before.
Two previous works suppressed the expected utility assumptions in Harsanyi’s
theorem, and they call for a brief technical comparison. In the unpublished
paper that the present one supersedes, Blackorby et al. (2004) started from a
Cartesian product set of state-contingent prospects, expressed conditions related
to the present ones but stated in utility terms directly, and eventually derived an
additively separable representation for social preference. At a closer look, this
representation boils down to expected utility, so that this early result can be
swept under Theorem 3 as a particular case. Not so for the theorem by Gajdos
et al. (2008), which requires a specialized framework in the style of Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) . The individual and social preferences there obey weaker
forms of von Neumann-Morgenstern independence and the sure-thing principle,
15An interesting recent option is objective Bayesianism (see Williamson, 2010)
16This is the most common solution (already in Hammond, 1981, and now much refined by
Fleurbaey, 2011).
17Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998) evaluate the solutions proposed at the time. More re-
cently, Gilboa et al. (2004), Chambers and Hayashi (2006), and Keeney and Nau (2011) have
taken up the challenge.
18Mongin (1995) provides a state-contingent version for Savage’s framework, and Blackorby
et al. (1999) provides another for Anscombe and Aumann’s.
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and they can be state-dependent. Under an appropriate Pareto condition, the
stringent conclusion (2) of a unique subjective probability emerges in more gen-
eral form, and the social utility representation can be expressed as a weighted
sum the individual ones. This result is closer to Harsanyi’s original than ours
by its choice of framework and assumptions.19
Note that M could also be interpreted as a set of moments in time, rather
than a set of states of nature. Then Theorem 3 becomes a statement about in-
tertemporal social choice. Coordinate Monotonicity, Row Preferences
and Column Preferences all have natural interpretations as Pareto or domi-
nance conditions, while Row Invariance says that the social observer’s prefer-
ences are unchanging over time. The weight vector p now describes a sequence
of discount factors, which are common to all agents. This conclusion reveals
a tension between applying the Pareto principle at each moment of time, and
applying it to entire social histories, granting the mild decision-theoretic condi-
tions. As before, it may be interpreted as either a sheer impossibility or only a
restriction; we lean towards the former view.
It remains to investigate the case in which the four conditions defined by this
section jointly apply. Note that if X has both Identical Column Spaces and
Identical Row Spaces, then there is a single open subset X ∗∗ such that X ij = X ∗∗
for all (i, j) ∈ N ×M .
Corollary 4 Suppose X ⊆ RNM is open, connected, sectionally connected, -
indifference connected, and has both Identical Row Spaces and Identical Column
Spaces. Then  has Row Preferences and Column Preferences and
satisfies Coordinate Monotonicity, Continuity, Row Invariance and
Column Invariance if and only if there is a single increasing, continuous
function u : X ∗∗ −→ R, and two strictly positive weight vectors q = (q1, . . . , qn) ∈
∆N and p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ ∆M , such that:
(a) The order 
M
is represented by the function WM : XM −→ R defined by
WM (x) :=
∑
i∈N
qi u(xi), for all x ∈ XM .
(b) The order N is represented by the function WN : XN −→ R defined by
WN (x) :=
∑
j∈M
pj u(xj), for all x ∈ XN .
(c) The order  is represented by the function W : X −→ R defined by
W (X) :=
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
qi pj u(x
i
j), for all X ∈ X .
19The aggregative results of Cre`s et al. (2011) concerning Min-Max utility can also be seen as
non-expected utility variants of Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem. However, unlike our results
and those of Gajdos et al. (2008), they rely on identical utility functions.
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(d) In this representation, the weight vectors q and p are unique, and the
function u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Since Row (Column) Invariance is unacceptable when the rows (columns)
refer to individuals, we must shift away from social-choice-theoretic interpre-
tation. Here is one from individual decision theory. Take N to be a set of
moments in time, while keeping M to be a set of states of nature. Thus,  rep-
resents intertemporal preferences under uncertainty. Elements of XN represent
instantaneous prospects (which by Identical Row Spaces could be realized at any
moment in time), while elements of XM represent ex post consumption streams
(which by Identical Column Spaces could be realized in any state of nature).
Now, by Row Invariance and Column Invariance, respectively, preferences
are state-independent over ex post consumption streams, and time-independent
over instantaneous prospects. The conclusion is that the agent maximizes the
expected value of a discounted utility sum. The next section will pursue the
two groups of applications at the same time.
4 A second theorem with application to subjec-
tive probability
We will now consider a variation of Theorem 3, which drops the requirements
that X be sectionally connected, indifference connected, and have identical col-
umn spaces. In exchange, we will need to impose a stronger condition on .
Let Y ⊆ RM be an open set. A subset Z ⊂ Y will be said to be flat if
Z = Y∩H, whereH is an affine hyperplane in RM . We also call flat a preference
order  on Y all indifference sets of which are flat. This is obviously the case if 
is represented by a linear utility function u(y) =
∑
j∈M cj yj . But the converse is
false, because flatness does not force the indifference hyperplanes to be parallel.
Suppose Y is convex; then  is flat only if its indifference sets are convex. More
specifically, if Y is a convex set of probability vectors, then  is flat if and only if
it satisfies the betweenness property. The latter is a restriction of von Neumann-
Morgenstern independence to indifferent lotteries, and it implies linear, but not
necessarily parallel indifference curves. The derived representation replaces the
expected utility form by a weighted utility form (see Chew, 1983, and Dekel,
1986). It has sometimes been suggested that betweenness offers a plausible
middle ground between empirical and normative validity.20
Theorem 5 Suppose X ⊆ RNM is open and connected, and XM is also con-
nected. Suppose that either 
M
is flat, or i is flat for every i ∈ N . Then  has
Row Preferences and Column Preferences and satisfies Continuity,
Coordinate Monotonicity, and Column Invariance if and only if there
is a strictly positive weight vector q ∈ ∆N , and a strictly positive weight vector
p ∈ ∆M , such that:
20See Epstein (1992) and Sarin and Wakker (1998) for a discussion roughly along this line.
16
(a) 
M
is represented by the linear function WM : XM−→R defined by
WM (x) :=
∑
i∈N
qi xi, for all x ∈ XM .
(b) For all i ∈ N , the order i is represented by the linear function WN :
X i−→R defined by
WN (x) :=
∑
j∈M
pj xj , for all x ∈ X i.
(Thus,  also satisfies Row Invariance.)
(c)  is represented by the linear function W : X −→R defined by
W (X) :=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
qi pj x
i
j , for all X ∈ X .
(d) Furthermore, q and p are unique in this representation.
The flatness restriction, hence Theorem 5, are relevant to the uncertain social
choice problem. Here, x ∈ X i is a personal prospect for i, xj is the utility this
individual receives if state j is realized, and flatness of i is a generalized form of
betweenness, as applied to state-contingent alternatives X instead of lotteries,
and furthermore without X being necessarily convex. The two weight vectors
obtained in the conclusions have a clear meaning: q compares the individuals
and p (a probability vector) compares the states. Thus, Theorem 5 reinforces
the message of Theorem 3 dramatically. As part (b) indicates, the individual
ex ante functions obey the expected utility form with the same subjective prob-
ability p, and moreover —this is the new implication —their preferences are
essentially the same. Adding Identical Row Spaces to the assumptions of The-
orem 5 would make these preferences exactly identical.21 In parts (a) and (c),
WM is an ex post social welfare function, and W is an ex ante social welfare
function, and both are of a classical utilitarian form, while W is also of the
expected utility type.22 Thus, the conclusions together express a reconciliation
of ex ante with ex post Paretianism and the exacting price that this imposes on
the diversity of individual characteristics.
Like Theorem 3, this result can be likened to Harsanyi’s, or rather, to
its state-contingent variations. Suppose the individuals satisfy the betweenness
property on top of dominance, and also suppose that the observer similarly sat-
isfies dominance, and is ex ante and ex post Paretian as far as his social welfare
criterion is concerned. Weak as they are compared with Harsanyi’s, these as-
sumptions suffice to entail his sum-of-utility formulas. Again, it is interesting
21Hammond (1981) also had this conclusion under his special microeconomic assumptions.
22Unlike those of Theorem 5, the social welfare functions delivered by Theorem 3 were
unweighted. However, this is a purely apparent difference, since the initial utility amounts
xij could be subjected to increasing transformations. If this was done, a weighted sum of
individual utilities would also result in Theorem 3.
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to compare Theorem 5 with the earlier results of Blackorby et al. (2004) and
Gajdos et al. (2008).
We now change directions, and give an interpretation of Theorem 5 that goes
beyond our initial list of examples. It has an interest of its own, beside illus-
trating the wide expressive power of the framework. Famously, Anscombe and
Aumann (1963) modified Savage’s axiomatization of subjective probability by
allowing some probabilistic information to enter their primitives. Given a set of
states of nature, they define prospects by associating these states with outcomes
taken in a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries instead of Savage’s non-
descript consequences. Technically, this change was motivated by the need to
derive subjective probability for finite sets of states, like ours in this paper. Let
us interpret M as being the set of states and N as being the (also finite) set of de-
terministic outcomes that underlies a convex set of von Neumann-Morgenstern
lotteries. If we take xij to represent the probability of getting outcome i in
state j, then alternatives in X become Anscombe-Aumann prospects, with xj
being the lottery associated with state j, and xi being a vector summarizing
the conditional probability of outcome i occurring under each state in M . This
sketch must however be refined, because it would make XM —a lottery set —
only (N − 1)-dimensional, and thus violate our full-dimensionality requirement
on X .
We will therefore base the set of von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries on
an enlarged set of outcomes M ∪ {0}, where 0 indexes one of the outcomes.
Formally, this lottery set is
∆0N := {x ∈ RN+ ;
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1},
where for all x, the probability that outcome 0 occurs is 1 −∑ni=1 xi. This
is an N -dimensional set, so the framework applies if we take prospects to be
elements of (∆0N )
M . Supposing as before that feasibility restrictions hold, we
assume that X ⊆ (∆0N )M is open and connected in RN×M . Because outcome
0 does not explicitly enter the definition of X , it can be restricted only through
the application of the axioms to the other outcomes, and this happens only
through Coordinate Monotonicity. This axiom now says that it is better,
ceteris paribus, to shift probability mass away from 0 to any other outcome in
N . (If xhk = y
h
k for all (h, k) ∈ N ×M \ {(i, j)} as the antecedent requires, then
xij > y
i
j only if x
0
j < y
0
j .) Thus, Coordinate Monotonicity means that 0
is the worst possible outcome. By relabelling the alternatives if necessary, this
can be assumed for any individual decision-maker, without loss of generality.
As for the other axiomatic conditions, Column Preferences is the dom-
inance property also assumed in Anscombe and Aumann (1963), to the effect
that an agent’s preferences over prospects should be increasing with respect to
her conditional preferences over lotteries. Meanwhile, Column Invariance
makes the agent’s lottery preferences state-independent, which is also implied
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by Anscombe-Aumann axioms.23 The only unusual axiom is Row Prefer-
ences , which extends the dominance property from conditionals on states to
conditionals on outcomes.
Now to the conclusions of Theorem 5. The vectors q and p define a nor-
malized utility function over N and a subjective probability vector on M , re-
spectively, and both serve to compute expected utility values in WM (x) (part
(a), this is in effect a repetition of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem) and
in W ( X) (part (c), which is the important one). With the uniqueness state-
ment (d), the conclusions are precisely those of the representation theorem in
Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
The added value lies in the derivation. Our driving technical condition is be-
tweenness, this time applied to lottery sets, and if we choose to apply it to 
M
,
we see that it exactly plays the role of Anscombe and Aumann’s assumption
that von Neumann-Morgenstern theory regulates the state-independent prefer-
ence over lotteries.24 In other words, only part of von Neumann-Morgenstern
independence is needed to derive a subjective probability from the agent’s pref-
erences under uncertainty. We also generalize Anscombe and Aumann’s con-
struction by allowing the set of prospects not to be Cartesian product, which
matters if across-state technical dependencies prevail between outcomes. The
price for these improvements is that we need the unconventional Row Prefer-
ences condition. However, it is justified after the fact by condition (b), which
holds true in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) even if they do not mention it.
5 Another result with application to economic
integration
We now return to the framework of section 2 and apply it to our last example,
i.e., the assessment of economic integration across a set of national economies.
Since the sectors define both the rows and columns, N = M and X is a space of
square (n×n) matrices. Let us fix the convention that row i records the inputs
to sector i from other sectors, so that, consistently, column j records the outputs
of sector j to the other sectors. This application deserves a separate treatment
for the following reason. If input-output matrices are to be compared in terms
of their degree of economic integration, and nothing else, some normalization is
clearly in order, but this will make the set X less than full dimensional in Rn×n,
apparently excluding it from the present framework.
To elaborate, we surely do not want the absolute sizes of two economies to
distort their integration ranking. One possibility is to reexpress the xij as frac-
tions of total GDP, which amounts to setting
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 x
i
j = 1 in the original
matrices, hence confining X within an (n2 − 1)-dimensional subspace of Rn×n.
23In effect, Anscombe and Aumann also have Identical Column Spaces, but this is dispens-
able.
24If we applied betweenness to the i preferences, an alternative derivation would result.
Then, the betweenness condition would evoke Savage’s sure-thing principle in weaker form.
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We should probably also be worried that the sectors within national economies
have different sizes and that this may affect international comparisons. A natu-
ral answer is to normalize by total input, i.e., putting
∑n
j=1 x
i
j = 1 for all i ∈ N ,
or by total output, i.e., putting
∑n
i=1 x
i
j = 1, for all j ∈ N . Either way secures
a fixed total sum of xij , so that the problem addressed by different GDPs is
also resolved. Here X is confined within an (n2 − n)-dimensional subspace of
Rn×n. Since the alternative set is not anymore an open subset of Rn×n, one of
the key structural conditions of Proposition 2 fails. Furthermore, some axioms
become vacuous, that is to say, Coordinate Monotonicity if matrices are
normalized by total GDP, and on top of this, either Row Preferences or
Column Preferences if the stronger normalization is resorted to.
Luckily, this technical difficulty can be superseded by making use of a third
natural feature of an integration ranking. Diagonal elements of the matrix rep-
resent a flow within one sector, rather than between sectors, and as such, they
are irrelevant to the comparison. Formally, let L := {(i, j) ∈ N × N ; i 6= j}
be the set of off-diagonal elements in the square N × N . Instead of assuming
that X is a subset of RN×M , we will define it to be a subset of RL. When
xij are fractions of either GDP or, say, total outputs, the hidden flows of goods
from each sector to itself act as slack variables, so X is an open set in RL and
incurs no loss of dimensionality. More generally, any accounting identity can be
accommodated if it only restricts X to be an open subset of Rn×(n−1).
It is easy to adapt the axioms to this modified framework. Coordinate
Monotonicity becomes:
For all (i, j) ∈ L, and all X,Y ∈ X with xhk = yhk for all (h, k) ∈
L \ {(i, j)}, we have X  Y if and only if xij ≥ yij.
For all i ∈ N , let Li := {(i, j); j ∈ N and j 6= i}, and let X i be the
projection of X onto RLi . For all j ∈ N , let Lj := {(i, j); i ∈ N and i 6= j} ,
and let Xj be the projection of X onto RLj . Row and Column Preferences
are now understood to apply with these new definitions of X i and X j .
Arguably, there is a fourth feature to the ranking problem. For the purpose
of assessing economic integration, the off-diagonal entries should not be treated
differently from one another. If they are equal in value, the flow of commodities
from sector i to sector j contributes just as much to the overall index as the flow
of commodities from sector h to sector k. But nothing yet forces the ranking to
be impartial in this fashion.
Let ΠN be the group of all permutations of N . For any pi ∈ ΠN , and any
X ∈ RL, we define a new matrix pi(X) ∈ RL by permuting both the rows and
the columns of X simultaneously. Formally, pi(X) := Y, where yij := x
pi(i)
pi(j)
for all (i, j) ∈ L. This is a well-defined operation, because (i, j) ∈ L if and
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only if (pi(i), pi(j)) ∈ L.25 A subset X ⊆ RL will be said to be permutation-
invariant if pi(X) ∈ X for all X ∈ X and all pi ∈ ΠN . Given one such X , the
following axiom captures the sense in which the integration ranking should not
discriminate between sectors.
Impartiality: For all pi ∈ ΠN and all X,Y ∈ X , X  Y if and only if
pi(X)  pi(Y).
Proposition 6 Let X be a connected, sectionally connected, relatively open
subset of RL , and let  be an order on X such that X is -indifference
connected.
(a) The order  has Row Preferences and Column Preferences, and
satisfies Coordinate Monotonicity and Continuity if and only if
for all (i, j) ∈ L, there exist continuous, increasing functions vij : X ij−→ R
such that  is represented by the function V defined by
V (X) :=
∑
(i,j)∈L
vij(x
i
j) for all X ∈ X .
In this case, for all i ∈ N , the order i is represented by the function V i
defined by
V i(xi) :=
∑
(i,j)∈Li
vij(x
i
j) for all x
i ∈ X i,
and for all j ∈ N , the order j is represented by the function Vj defined
by
Vj(xj) :=
∑
(i,j)∈Lj
vij(x
i
j) for all xj ∈ Xj.
The functions {vij}i,j∈N are unique up to positive affine transformations
with a common multiplier.
(b) If X is permutation-invariant, then there is a single open interval X ∗∗ ⊆ R
such that X ij = X ∗∗ for all (i, j) ∈ L. If the order  is as in part (a), then
it also satisfies Impartiality if and only if there is a single continuous
increasing function v : X ∗∗ −→R such that vij = v for all (i, j) ∈ L. Thus,
the representations in part (a) simplify to
∑
(i,j)∈L′
v(xij) (where L
′ is either
Li or Li or L, as appropriate).
25For example, take n = m = 3, let
X =
 • 0.05 0.080.12 • 0.17
0.15 0.13 •
 ,
and suppose pi(1) = 2, pi(2) = 3 and pi(3) = 1. Then
σ(X) =
 • 0.17 0.120.13 • 0.15
0.05 0.08 •
 .
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In words, under the revised monotonicity conditions, the ranking of economic
integration takes the form of an additively separable function, which sums up
quantities evaluating the flows between every pair of distinct sectors in the
economy. Furthermore, if the ranking treats all sectors the same, then these
basic quantities are obtained from a single function. While standard input-
output analysis approaches economic integration in terms of discrete concepts,
such as the algebraic decomposability of matrices, we have provided a continuous
ranking that is amenable to a numerical index. 26
6 Conclusion
The paper has developed a new approach for ranking multiattribute alternatives
that permits multiple applications. Those covered here are sufficient to illustrate
its power, but others have independent interest and would call for an analysis
using it. Even in the field of welfare economics broadly conceived, where our ap-
proach heuristically originates, there seems to be more room for concrete work.
We may put GDP time-series, wealth distributions, or systems of interpersonal
utility comparison into suitable matrix form, and each time check whether or
not the axioms introduced here meaningfully apply. Some of these cases will
raise the loss of dimensionality problem that underlies our application to input-
output tables. Not all them will accommodate the special invariant preference
and identical spaces axioms that enhanced our treatment of uncertain prospects.
So the forthcoming applications will probably range all the way from the more
basic Propositions 3, 5 and 7 to the very precise Theorems 4 and 6. On the other
hand, given the objections to additive separability in the certainty context, our
approach does not do justice to the intertemporal consumption problem, and to
make it flexible enough to capture this example well opens up another avenue
of research.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, Row Monotonicity or Column Monotonicity
imply Coordinate Monotonicity. We show the nontrivial converse. Sup-
pose X is convex, and satisfies Coordinate Monotonicity; we will show that
it satisfies Column Monotonicity. Let j ∈M and i ∈ N , and let x,y ∈ Xj .
Suppose xh = yh for all h ∈M \ {i}; we must show that x j y if and only if
xi ≥ yi.
Case 1. First suppose X is a box. Then we can find X˜, Y˜ ∈ X such that
x˜j = x and y˜j = y, while y˜k = x˜k for all k ∈M \ {j}. Thus, we have:
(x j y) ⇐⇒
(
X˜  Y˜
)
⇐⇒ (x˜ij ≥ y˜ij) ⇐⇒ (xi ≥ yi) ,
26Compare with the up-to-date survey of input-output analysis in Miller and Blair (2009).
For more economic perspective on the subject, see Kurz et al. (1998) and the classic application
by Leontief (1959).
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as desired, by applying firstColumn Preferences, then Coordinate Mono-
tonicity, and finally the definition of X˜ and Y˜.
Case 2. Now let X be any open convex set. Then the coordinate projection
Xj is also open and convex, so the line segment L between x and y is in Xj .
For each z ∈ L, we can find an open box Bz ⊆ Xj that contains z, and an open
box B˜z ⊆ X that projects onto Bz. Apply the argument from Case 1 to B˜z to
show that j satisfies Column Monotonicity when restricted to Bz. Since
L is compact, it can be covered with a finite collection of boxes like Bz, and j
satisfies Column Monotonicity on each one. An inductive argument leads
one to conclude that x j y if and only if xi ≥ yi.
The proof of Row Monotonicity is similar, only using Row Prefer-
ences instead of Column Preferences. 
Proof of Example (a) just above Proposition 2. Without loss of generality,
we can take X = (0, 1)N×M . Fix X ∈ X , letting Y := {Y ∈ X ; Y ≈ X}.
GivenY1,Y2 ∈ Y, we must find a path in Y connectingY1 to Y2.
Define 1 ∈ RN×M by setting 1ij := 1 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M . By Con-
tinuity and Coordinate Monotonicity, there exists r1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
r1 1 ∈ Y. Let Z1 ⊂ X be the open line segment from Y1 to 1. For all Z ∈ Z1,
Coordinate Monotonicity implies that Z  Y1. Again by Continuity
and Coordinate Monotonicity, there exists rZ ∈ (0, 1] such that rZ Z ∈ Y.
The set L1 := {rZ Z; Z ∈ Z1} is a continuous path in Y from Y1 to r1 1.
Likewise, a continuous path L2 can be found in Y from Y2 to r1 1. A path
in Y from Y1 to Y2 results from joining it to L1. 
The proof of Proposition 2 is based on the Gorman-Debreu theory of addi-
tive representations for separable preference orders, which requires some back-
ground. Let I be an indexing set (e.g. I = N ×M), let Y be an open subset
of RI , and for all i ∈ I, let Yi be the projection of Y onto the i-th coordinate.
A preference order  on Y has a fully additive representation if there exist
functions ui : Yi−→R, for all i ∈ I, such that if we define U : Y−→R by
U(y) :=
∑
i∈I
ui(yi),
then U represents .
For any y ∈ Y, we say that  admits a fully additive representation near y
if there is an open neighbourhood Y ′ ⊆ Y around y, such that  admits a fully
additive representation when restricted to Y ′. We will use the following result.
Lemma A1 Let Y be an open, connected, sectionally connected subset of RI ,
and let  be a continuous, indifference-connected preference order on Y, which
is strictly increasing in every coordinate. If  admits a fully additive represen-
tation near every y ∈ Y, then  admits a fully additive representation on Y.
Furthermore, this global additive representation is unique up to a positive affine
transformation.
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Proof. See Theorem 2.2 of Chateauneuf and Wakker (1993). 
Let J ⊆ I, and let K := I \ J . For any y ∈ Y, define yJ := [yj ]j∈J (an
element of RJ) and yK := [yk]k∈K (an element of RK). We say that  is J-
separable (or that J is a -separable subset of I) if the following holds. For all
x,y,x′, y′ ∈ Y, if
xK = yK , xJ = x
′
J ,
x′K = y
′
K , and yJ = y
′
J ,
then (x  y) ⇐⇒ (x′  y′). We say that  is totally separable if every
subset J ⊆ I is -separable. A well-known result applies these concepts to the
case where Y is an open box.
Lemma A2 If  is a continuous, totally separable preference order on an open
box B ⊆ RI , and  is increasing in every coordinate, then  has a fully additive
utility representation.
Proof. See Theorem 3 in Debreu (1960). 
Let J ⊆ I and K := I \ J . We say that J is strictly -essential if, for any
y ∈ Y, there exist x,x′ ∈ Y such that xK = x′K = yK , but x  x′. (In
words, it is possible to create a strict preference by only manipulating the J
coordinates, while keeping the K coordinates fixed at any stipulated values.)
Lemma A3 Let  be a continuous preference order on an open box B ⊆ RI .
Let J,K ⊆ I be two -separable subsets, such that J ∩K 6= ∅. Suppose that J ,
K, and J ∩K are all strictly -essential. Then:
(a) J ∪K is -separable.
(b) J ∩K is -separable.
Proof. See Theorem 1 by Gorman (1968b) for the original result, Theorem 4.7
of Blackorby et al. (1978) for a restatement, and Theorem 11 and Proposition
16 of von Stengel (1993) for the most general treatment. 
Now, for any i ∈ N , define Mi := {(i, j); j ∈ M}. We can write RN×M =
RM1 ×RM2 ×· · ·×RMn . For any j ∈M , define Nj := {(i, j); i ∈ N}. Similarly,
we can write RN×M = RN1 × RN2 × · · · × RNm .
Lemma A4 As in Lemma A3, let  be a continuous preference order on an
open box B ⊆ RN×M . For all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , suppose the sets Nj and Mi
are -separable, and the set {(i, j)} is -strictly essential. Then  is totally
separable.
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Proof. Clearly, the union of two strictly  -essential subsets of N×M is strictly
essential. Since every singleton subset of N×M is strictly -essential, it follows
that every subset of N ×M is strictly -essential.
To show from the assumptions that  is totally separable, consider the cases
of singleton and doubleton subsets of N×M . Singletons {(i, j)} are intersections
of the -separable subsets Mi and Nj , hence -separable by Lemma A3(b). A
slightly more roundabout application of Lemma A3 shows that doubletons are
-separable. Finally, prove that any subset J ⊆ N × M is -separable, by
induction on |J |, doubleton separability, and Lemma A3(a). (See also Corollary
to Theorem 3.7 in Keeney and Raiffa, 1976.) 
Remark. To show that doubletons are separable in the proof of Lemma A4, we
need n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2. This is the key place in the proofs of our main results
where this assumption is necessary.
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) Given X ∈ X , there is an open box B of RNM
such that X ∈ B ⊆ X . We first show that if  is restricted to B, then it is
Mi-separable for all i ∈ N . Let Y,Z, Y,Z ∈ B, and suppose that (a) yh = zh
for all h ∈ N \ {i}, (b) yi = yi, (c) yh = zh for all h ∈ N \ {i}, and (d)
zi = zi. Then
(Y  Z) ⇐⇒ (yi i zi) ⇐⇒ (yi i zi) ⇐⇒ (Y  Z) ,
showing that  is Mi-separable. (The first equivalence is by (a) and Row
Preferences, the second by (b) and (d), and the last one by (c) and Row
Preferences.)
By a similar argument based on Column Preferences, if  is restricted to
B, then it is Nj-separable for all j ∈M .
It remains to show that  has a fully additive representation on B. By Con-
tinuity,  is continuous on B. Coordinate Monotonicity implies that
every coordinate is strictly essential. We have just shown that Mi and Nj are
separable for all i and j; thus Lemma A4 implies that  is totally separable on
B. Finally, Lemma A2 and Coordinate Monotonicity yield an additive
representation of  on B. This proves part (a) with Y =B.
Proof of (b). This follows from part (a), along with Coordinate Mono-
tonicity, Continuity and Lemma A1.27. (Alternately, we could have directly
proved (b) by applying Theorem 1 of Segal (1992).)
Proof of (d). Fix X ∈ X , and consider the section of X in the jth dimension
through X, as defined by:
Sj(X) := {Y ∈ X ; yk = xk, for all k ∈M \ {j}}.
27This is the one place in the proof that makes use of sectional connectedness and indifference
connectedness.
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Let Xj(X) := {yj ; Y ∈ Sj(X)} ⊆ Xj . Column Preferences implies that ,
when restricted to Sj(X), is equivalent to j on Xj( X). Thus, part (b) implies
that the order j on Xj(X) is represented by the function UXj defined by
UXj (y) :=
a constant︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
k∈M\{j}
∑
i∈N
uik(x
i
k) +
∑
i∈N
uij(y
i),
for all y ∈ Xj(X). Thus, the function Uj :=
∑
i∈N u
i
j(y
i) also represents j on
Xj(X). This holds for all X ∈ X ; thus Uj represents j on Xj =
⋃
X∈X
Xj(X).
Proof of (c). Similar to the proof of (d), only using Row Preferences
instead of Column Preferences. 
To prove Theorem 3, we must solve a Pexider functional equation on a general
domain. The solution is provided by the following result.
Lemma A5 Let Y ⊆ RJ be an open, connected set. For all j ∈ [1 . . . J ], let
Yj be the projection of Y onto the jth coordinate, and let Y0 := {
∑J
j=1 yj;
y ∈ Y}.28 For all j ∈ [0 . . . J ], let fj : Yj−→R be functions, at least one of
which is continuous, and suppose they satisfy the Pexider equation:
f0
 J∑
j=1
yj
 = j∑
j=1
fj(yj), for all y ∈ Y.
Then there exist (unique) constants a, b0, b1, b2, . . . , bJ ∈ R such that b0 =∑J
j=1 bj, and such that, for all j ∈ [0 . . . J ], fj(y) = a y + bj for all y ∈ Yj.
Proof. See Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 in Rado´ and Baker (1987) . 
Proof of Theorem 3. The “if” direction is obvious; we will prove the “only if”
direction.
Proof of (a). This follows from adapting the representations in Proposition
2(d) to the fact that X now satisfies Identical Column Spaces and  now
satisfies Column Invariance. (Specifically, for all i ∈ N , and all x ∈ XM ,
define ui(xi) := ui1(x
i), and put WM = U1, where U1 is defined by setting j = 1
in Proposition 2(d).)
To prove parts (b)-(d), we we need the following claim.
Claim 1: For any j ∈ M , there exist constants aj > 0 and bij ∈ R such that
uij(x
i) = aj u
i
1(x
i) + bij for all x ∈ XM and i ∈ N .
28Thus, Y0,Y1, . . . ,YJ are all open intervals in R.
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Proof. By Identical Column Spaces, XM is the same as Xj for any j ∈ M , so
it is an open and connected set of Rn by the usual properties of the projection
map. Let j ∈ M , and let U1 and Uj be as in Proposition 2(d). By Column
Invariance, both U1 and Uj , represent M on XM . Thus, there are continuous,
increasing transformations gj : R −→R such that Uj = gj ◦ U1, or
∑
i∈N
uij(x
i) = gj
(∑
i∈N
ui1(x
i)
)
, for all x ∈ XM . (A1)
The image set Z := {(u11(x1), . . . , un1 (xn)) ; x ∈ XM} is also open and connected
in RN , because the ui1 are continuous and increasing, hence open.29 If we make
the change of variables zi := ui1(x
i) for all i ∈ N , then (A1) becomes the Pexider
equation: ∑
i∈N
uij ◦ (ui1)−1(zi) = gj
(∑
i∈N
zi
)
, for all z ∈ Z.
Lemma A5 applied to Z yields constants aj and b1j , . . . , bnj ∈ R such that uij ◦
(ui1)
−1(zi) = aj zi + bij for all z ∈ Z and all i ∈ N , hence such that uij(xi) =
aj u
i
1(x
i) + bij for any x ∈ XM . Finally, aj > 0 because uij and ui1 are both
increasing. ♦ Claim 1
Proof of (c). Let A :=
∑
j∈M aj and pj := aj/A for all j ∈ M , so that
p = (p1, . . . , pm) is a strictly positive weight vector on M . Claim 1 implies
that, for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , and all X ∈ X ,
uij(x
i
j) = Apj u
i(xij) + b
i
j . (A2)
If we let U : X−→R be as in Proposition 2(a,b), and define B := ∑i∈N∑j∈M bij ,
then for all X ∈ X ,
U(X) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
uij(x
i
j) = A ·
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
pj u
i(xij) +
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
bij
= A ·
∑
j∈M
pj
(∑
i∈N
ui(xij)
)
+B = A ·W (X) +B,
where W is defined as in equation (3). Thus, W is an increasing transform of
U , so it represents  on X .
Proof of (b). Let U i be as in Proposition 2(c). Then for all x ∈ X i, we have
U i(x) =
∑
j∈M
uij(xj) = A
∑
j∈M
pj u
i(xj) +
∑
j∈M
bij = AU
i
p(x)+[a constant],
where the second equality is by (A2). Thus, U ip represents i.
29Any function φ from an open subset of R to R that is continuous and increasing is also
open. We will make repeated use of this property.
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Proof of (d). For all i ∈ N , let u˜i : R−→R be a continuous and increasing
function, and let p˜ ∈ ∆M be a strictly positive weight vector. Suppose that M
is represented by the function W˜M : XM−→R defined by
W˜M (x) :=
∑
i∈N
u˜i(xi), for all x ∈ XM .
and that  is also represented by the function W˜ : X−→R defined by
W˜ (X) :=
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
p˜j u˜
i(xij), for all X ∈ X .
Now,
∑
i∈N u˜
i(xi) = g(
∑
i∈N u
i(xi)) for some increasing and continuous trans-
formation g.30 Thus carrying the same functional equation argument as for
Claim 1, we conclude that there are constants a > 0 and b1, . . . , bn ∈ R such
that
u˜i(xi) = a ui(xi) + bi, (A3)
for all i ∈ I and x ∈ XM . Thus, u1, . . . , un are unique up to a common affine
transformation, as was to be proved.
Meanwhile, the uniqueness part of Proposition 2(a) yields constants A > 0
and bij ∈ R, for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , such that
p˜j u˜
i(xij) = Apju
i(xij) + b
i
j , (A4)
for all X ∈ X , i ∈ N and j ∈ M . Let x ∈ X 1. The set X 1 is open, and u1 is
continuous and increasing; thus, there exist some ε > 0 and some y ∈ X 1 such
that u1(xj)− u1(yj) = ε for all j ∈M . But then, for all j ∈M ,
aεp˜j = ap˜j u
1(xj)− a p˜j u1(yj) = p˜j u˜1(xj)− p˜j u˜1(yj) (by Eq.(A3))
= Apj u
1(xj)−Apj u1(yj) = Aεpj , (by Eq.(A4)).
It follows that a εp˜ = Aεp, and thus A = a, since p and p˜ are weight vectors.
Thus, p = p˜, which completes the proof of (d). 
Proof of Corollary 4. Again, we prove the “only if” direction. Theorem 3(c)
says that  is represented by the function W : X−→R defined by equation ( 3).
Now, by the variant of this theorem using Row-independent Preferences
and Identical row spaces, there is a weight vector q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) ∈ ∆N ,
and, for all j ∈ M , there is an increasing, continuous function vj : X ∗j−→R,
such that N is represented by the function WN : X−→ R defined by
WN (x) :=
∑
j∈M
vj(xj), for all x ∈ XN , (A5)
30If f and h are continuous real-valued functions on some connected subset B ⊆ R, and g
is an increasing real-valued function such that h = g ◦ f , then g is continuous on f(B). We
will make repeated use of this fact.
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while  is represented by the function W˜ : X −→R defined by
W˜ (X) :=
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
qi vj(x
i
j), for all X ∈ X . (A6)
Now fix x0 ∈ X ∗∗ . By Theorem 3(d) and its variant, we can subtract relevant
constants from the functions {vj}j∈M and {ui}i∈N , to ensure that
vj(x0) = 0 for all j ∈M , and ui(x0) = 0 for all i ∈ N . (A7)
Since  is represented by both W and W˜ , there is some continuous, increas-
ing function f : R−→ R such that:
f
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
pj u
i(xij)
 = ∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
qi vj(x
i
j), for all X ∈ X . (A8)
For all i ∈ N and j ∈M , define gij(ζ) := qi vj ◦ (ui)−1(ζ/pj) for all ζ ∈ R where
this definition makes sense. Define Ξ := {[pjui(xij)]i∈Nj∈M ; X ∈ X}, an open,
connected subset of RN×M . Then substituting ξij := pjui(xij) into both sides of
equation (A8) yields
f
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
ξij
 = ∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
gij(ξ
i
j), for all ξ ∈ Ξ.
Now Lemma A5 implies that there exists a constant a > 0 such that f(ζ) =
a ζ = gij(ζ) for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M . (Equation (A7) implies that the added
constants of Lemma A5 are all 0.) By rescaling {vj}j∈M if necessary, we can
assume that a = 1; hence gij(ζ) = ζ. But g
i
j(ζ) = q
i vj ◦ (ui)−1(ζ/pj), so this
implies that pj u
i = qi vj , for all (i, j) ∈ N ×M . Dividing these equations by
qi pj (which are nonzero), we obtain
ui/qi = vj/p
j , for all (i, j) ∈ N ×M.
It follows that there is a single increasing continuous function u : X ∗∗ → R such
that
(a) ui/qi = u for all i ∈ N and (b) vj/pj = u for all j ∈M . (A9)
Substituting equation (A9)(a) into equation (1) yields part (a) of the result.
Substituting (A9)(b) into (A5) yields part (b), while substituting (A9)(b) into
(A6) yields part (c). Part (d) is straightforward. 
The proof of Theorem 5 relies on the following Lemma.
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Lemma A6 Let Z ⊆ RM be an open set. For all j ∈ M , let Zj be the
projection of Z onto the jth coordinate, and let uj : Zj−→R be a continuous
increasing function. Define U(z) =
∑m
j=1 uj(zj) for all z ∈ Z, and let  be
the preference order on Z represented by U . Then  is flat if and only if the
functions u1, . . . , um are affine.
Proof. If u1, . . . , um are affine, then clearly  is flat. To prove the converse, fix
z ∈ Z, and let Y(z) := {y ∈ Z; z ≈ y} be its indifference surface. If  is flat,
then there is some hyperplane H ⊂ RM such that Y(z) = H∩Z. The equation
of this hyperplane is
∑m
j=1 aj yj = b, with all the aj being non-zero because uj
is increasing and Z is open in RM .31 Without loss of generality, suppose a1 = 1.
Then for all y ∈ R[2...m],y1 = b− m∑
j=2
aj yj
 =⇒ ((y1,y) ∈ H) .
Let Y ′ be a connected component of Y(z); then Y ′ is a relatively open subset of
H. If C := U(z), then U(y) = C for all y ∈ Y ′. Define Y ′j to be the projection of
Y ′ onto the jth coordinate, and Y ′[2...m] to be the projection of Y ′ onto R[2...m].
The set Y ′[2...m] is an open and connected in R[2...m] by the usual properties of
the projection map.
For all y ∈ Y ′[2...m], if y1 = b−
∑m
j=2 aj yj , then (y1,y) ∈ Y ′ and U(y1,y) =
C. In other words,
u1
b− m∑
j=2
aj yj
+ m∑
j=2
uj(yj) = C, for all y ∈ Y ′[2...m].
and this can be rewritten as a Pexider equation:
u1
 m∑
j=2
y˜j
 = m∑
j=2
u˜j
(
y˜j − b/m
aj
)
, for all y ∈ Y ′[2...m].
by putting y˜j :=
b
m − aj yj and u˜j := Cm − uj for all j ∈ [2...m]. Lemma A5
implies that, for all j ∈ M , the function u˜j is affine on Y ′j . Thus, uj is affine
when restricted to Y ′j .
By repeating this argument for all connected components of Y(z), and for
all z ∈ Z, we can cover Zj with open subsets such that uj is affine on each
subset. But Z is connected, so Zj also is, and by a standard argument based on
path-connectedness, we can conclude that for all j ∈M , uj is an affine function
on Zj . 
Proof of Theorem 5. The “if” direction is obvious; we will prove the “only if”
direction.
31For example, suppose a1 = 0; then there exists  > 0 such that y = (z1+, z2, z3, . . . , zM )
is in H∩ Z = Y(z), and thus, U(y) = U(z), which contradicts the fact that u1 is increasing.
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Claim 1: For any X ∈X , there exists an open neighbourhood BX ⊆ X and
constants cij,X > 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , such that  is represented on BX
by the function UX : BX−→R defined by UX(B) :=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M c
i
j,X · bij for all
B ∈ BX. We can assume max{cij,X; i ∈ N and j ∈M} = 1.
Proof. Proposition 2(a) yields an open rectangular neighbourhood
BX =
∏
i∈N
∏
j∈M
Bij,X ⊂ X ,
as well as continuous, increasing functions uij,X : Bij,X−→R, for all i ∈ N and j ∈
M , such that  is represented on BX by the function UX defined by UX(B) :=∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M u
i
j,X(b
i
j) for all B ∈ BX . We consider the two flatness assumptions
of the theorem in turn.
Case 1. Suppose i is flat for all i ∈ N . Let BiX :=
∏
j∈M Bij,X; then
BiX ⊆ X i. Proposition 2(c) says that i is represented on BiX by the function
U iX defined by U
i
X(b) :=
∑
j∈M u
i
j,X(b
j) for all b ∈ BiX. Lemma A6 implies
that for all j ∈ M , uij,X is affine on Bij,X; i.e., that for all j ∈ M , there exist
constants cij,X > 0 and d
i
j,X ∈ R such that uij,X(b) = cij,X b+dij,X for all b ∈ Bij,X.
Without loss of generality, we can set dij,X = 0 in these equations. By the first
assumption of the theorem, they hold for all i ∈ N . Noting that cij,X > 0 by
Coordinate Monotonicity, we can multiply the coefficients {cij,X}i∈Nj∈M by a
positive constant without changing the representations, and thus ensure that
max{cij,X; i ∈ N, j ∈M} = 1.
Case 2. Suppose 
M
is flat. Fix j ∈M , and let BXj :=
∏
i∈N Bij,X; then BXj ⊆
Xj . Proposition 2(d) and Column Invariance imply that M is represented
on BXj by the function UXj defined by UXj (b) :=
∑
i∈N u
i
j,X(bi) for all b ∈ BXj .
Lemma A6 implies that for all j ∈M , uij,X is affine on Bij,X. This holds for all
j ∈M . Now proceed as in Case 1. ♦ Claim 1
Claim 2: There exist constants cij > 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , such
that  is represented on X by the function U : X−→R defined by U(X) :=∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M c
i
j · xij for all X ∈X .
Proof. Take X,X′ ∈ X and the associated rectangular neighbourhoods BX
and BX′ of Claim 1, supposing that B′ = BX ∩ BX′ 6= ∅. Then Claim 1 implies
that the functions UX and U X′ , defined by UX(B) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M c
i
j,X · bij and
UX′(B) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M c
i
j,X′ · bij for all B ∈ B′, both represent  on B′, so
they are ordinally equivalent on B′. Thus, there is some continuous, increasing
function g : R−→R such that:
g
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
cij,X · bij
 = ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
cij,X′ · bij , for all B ∈ B′.
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Lemma A5 for this Pexider equation yields A > 0 such that cij,X′b
i
j = Ac
i
j,Xb
i
j
for all i ∈ N and j ∈M and B ∈ B′. Since B′ is open in RN×M , we may divide
by bij in each of these equations, and conclude that c
i
j,X′ = Ac
i
j,X for all i ∈ N
and j ∈ M . However, max{cij,X; i ∈ N and j ∈ M} = 1 = max{cij,X′ ; i ∈ N
and j ∈M}, hence A = 1, and cij,X = cij,X′ for all i ∈ N and j ∈M .
Now, by another argument based on the path-connectedness of X , we cancel
the dependence on X in the cij,Xcoefficients and conclude that  is represented
on all of X by the function U defined as above. ♦ Claim 2
Claim 3: For all j ∈ M , the order 
M
is represented on Xj by the function
Uj defined by Uj(x) :=
∑
i∈N
cij x
i, for all x ∈ Xj .
Proof. The proof is the same as for Proposition 2(d), but with Column In-
variance. ♦ Claim 3
Claim 4: For all j, k ∈M , if Xj ∩Xk 6= ∅, then there exists a constant ajk > 0
such that cij = ajk c
i
k for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let Xjk be any connected component of Xj ∩ Xk. Claim 3 implies that
the functions Uj and Uk both represent M on Xjk. Thus, they are ordinally
equivalent, yielding another Pexider equation. Just as in the proof of Claim 2,
we can use Lemma A5 to find ajk > 0 such that c
i
j x
i = ajk c
i
k x
i for all x ∈ Xjk
and i ∈ N . Since Xjk is an open subset of RM , this implies that cij = ajk cik for
all i ∈ N . ♦ Claim 4
Claim 5: For all j, k ∈ M , then there exists a constant ajk > 0 such that
cij = ajk c
i
k for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Fix j and k, and observe that there are a subset of indexes Λ =
{λ1, ..., λL} ⊆M with λ1 = j, λL = k, such Xλ` ∩Xλ`+1 6= ∅ for all ` ∈ [1 . . . L].
(This follows from the fact that XM is a connected set; we skip the easy topo-
logical argument.) Let ajλ2 , aλ2λ3 , . . . , aλL−1k > 0 be the constants obtained in
Claim 4. Then define ajk := ajλ2 · aλ2λ3 · · · aλL−1k. Then iterated application
of Claim 4 yields the result. ♦ Claim 5
Proof of (a). For all i ∈ N , define qi := ci1, and for all j ∈ N , define pj := aj1.
Then for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , Claim 5 implies that
cij = aj1 c
i
1 = pj q
i. (A10)
Thus, fixing j and using the definition of Uj(x) in Claim 3, we have that for all
x ∈ Xj ,
Uj(x) =
∑
i∈N
cij x
i =
∑
i∈N
pj q
i xi = pj
∑
i∈N
qi xi = pjWM (x),
Then Claim 3 implies that WM represents M on Xj . Since this holds for all
j ∈M , WM represents M on XM =
⋃
j∈M Xj .
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Proof of (c). Define U as in Claim 2. Then, for all X ∈ X , equation (A10)
yields
U(X) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
cij · xij =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
qj p
i xij = W (X).
Thus, Claim 2 implies that W represents  on X .
Proofs of (b) and (d). Similar to the proofs of Theorem 3(b,d). 
Proof of Proposition 6. The “if” direction is obvious; we will prove the “only
if” direction. If n = 2, then |L| = 2. Then an ordering  on RL satisfies
Coordinate Monotonicity if and only if it is totally separable; the additive
representation then follows from Debreu (1960).
So, suppose n ≥ 3. Then the proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition
2, except that Lemma A4 is replaced with the following claim.
Claim 1: Let n ≥ 3, and  be a continuous preference order on an open box
B ⊆ RL. For all i ∈ N and j ∈M , suppose the sets Li and Lj are -separable,
and the set {(i, j)} is -strictly essential. Then  is totally separable.
The proof of Claim 1 is very similar to the proof of Lemma A4 (suitably
adapted to the n × n square minus the diagonal). The proof of part (a) now
follows the proof of Proposition 2 verbatim, only using Claim 1 in place of
Lemma A4. (To see this, observe that the proof of Proposition 2 makes no
reference to the structure of the set N ×M . Thus, the same argument works
if we replace N ×M with L. The separability of the subsets Li and Lj again
follows from Row Monotonicity and Column Monotonicity. Lemmas A1
and A2 apply to any abstract Cartesian product.)
Proof of (b). Let pi ∈ Π. Since pi(X ) = X , we have X pi(i)pi(j) = X ij for all
i, j ∈ N . Repeating this for all pi ∈ Π, we conclude that X ij = X hk for all pairs
(h, i) ∈ L and (j, k) ∈ L which are in the same Π-orbit. But it is easy to see
that Π acts transitively on L. Thus, we obtain X ∗∗ ⊆ R such that X ij = X ∗∗
for all (i, j) ∈ L.
Now, for any pi ∈ Π, define Vpi := V ◦ pi−1 : X−→R. Thus, for all X ∈ X ,
we have
Vpi( X) =
∑
(i′,j′)∈L
vi
′
j′
(
x
pi−1(i′)
pi−1(j′)
)
=
∑
(i,j)∈L
v
pi(i)
pi(j)(x
i
j).
(Here, the last step is by the change of variables i := pi−1(i′) and j := pi−1(j′),
because pi is a bijection of N .) But Impartiality implies that Vpi also rep-
resents the order . Thus, by uniqueness up to affine transformations, we
obtain some constant a > 0 and constants bij for all i, j ∈ N × N such that
v
pi(i)
pi(j) = a v
i
j + b
i
j for all (i, j) ∈ N . It follows that vpi
2(i)
pi2(j) = a
2 vij+[a constant],
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and v
pi3(i)
pi3(j) = a
3 vij+[a constant], and so on. But pi
n is the identity map on L.
Thus, we get vij = a
n vij+[a constant], which means that a
n = 1, which means
a = 1.
Thus, v
pi(i)
pi(j) = v
i
j+b
i
j for all (i, j) ∈ N . Repeating this argument for all pi ∈ Π,
we conclude that there is a single continuous increasing function v : X ∗∗ −→ R
and constants cij for all (i, j) ∈ L such that vij = v + cij for all (i, j) ∈ L.
Since adding a constant does not change the representation, we can remove
the constants cij , and assume without loss of generality that v
i
j = v for all
(i, j) ∈ L. 
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